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Abstract
The notion that public managers influence organizational performance is common in public 
administration research.  However, less is known about why some managers are better at 
influencing organizational performance than others.  Furthermore, relatively few studies have 
systematically examined managerial influence and scholars have yet to investigate either 
quantitatively or systematically managerial influence in the White House.  Utilizing original 
survey data collected from former White House officials who served in the Reagan, George 
H.W. Bush, and Clinton administrations, this study applies empirical public management 
theory to examine for the first time the key determinants that shape perceptions of chief of staff 
managerial influence.  The findings demonstrate how several core concepts in public 
management theory help explain the dynamics that drive perceptions of managerial influence, 
thereby providing a new contribution to the literature on public management.
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INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 1994, President Bill Clinton embarked on a major shake-up of his senior advisers when he 
replaced chief of staff Thomas F. ‘Mack’ McLarty III with then-budget director Leon E. Panetta (see Horvitz 1994).  
Over the previous year and a half, Clinton had developed a reputation for allowing too many advisers unfettered 
access to Oval Office meetings while McLarty—a lifelong friend and Washington outsider nicknamed ‘Mack the 
Nice’—had been unable to control or correct the disorganization and miscommunication that ensued.  By Clinton’s 
own recollection, ‘There used to be chaos around here.  Every day we would have three, four meetings lasting hours 
and hours.  I’d sit in them, and we’d make decisions like a committee.  And every day I’d read about them in the 
papers.  It got so that the public had an impression that I was indecisive’ (Hamilton 2007, 468).  Stepping in to 
rectify the situation, Panetta—known throughout the Washington Beltway for his management and negotiation 
skills—asserted himself in ending Clinton’s open-ended bull sessions by streamlining the management of policy and 
personnel.  Ultimately, Panetta’s influence in redirecting operations at the White House and his continued leadership 
during his three-year tenure as chief of staff helped solidify his reputation  among White House personnel (e.g., see 
Drew 1995; Hamilton 2007).
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The narrative that developed amid the transition from McLarty to Panetta implied that where McLarty appeared to 
lack influence in his managerial duties, Panetta was able to instill it over White House personnel as the succeeding
chief of staff.  But why, exactly, was Panetta perceived to be more influential than McLarty and how did his 
approach help set a new tone for changing the way business was conducted in the Clinton White House?  In the 
broader context, what are the qualities and characteristics that formulate overall perceptions of chief of staff 
influence and how might such assessments connect and relate to White House organizational performance?
Although public administration scholars have long understood that managers possess significant potential for 
exerting influence over personnel and the functions of their organizations, relatively few studies have systematically 
examined why managers are perceived as influential or how such evaluations relate to organizational performance.  
Indeed, although previous studies on managerial influence have accumulated a great deal of knowledge through in-
depth qualitative examinations (McGregor 1974; Doig and Hargrove 1987; Hargrove and Glidewell 1990; Behn 
1991; Thompson and Jones 1994; Ban 1995; Cohen and Eimicke 1995; Riccucci 1995; Holzer and Callahan 1998), 
only recently have scholars begun to utilize theoretical models and quantitative techniques to conduct more 
systematic research (e.g., O’Toole and Meier 1999; Meier and O’Toole 2011).  Furthermore, scholars have rarely 
examined key political institutions in their attempts to uncover causal relationships between managerial actions and 
characteristics and their impact on the relevant organizations (but see Romzek 2000; Rosenthal and Bell 2003).  This 
is particularly true concerning research on the institutional underpinnings of the contemporary American presidency, 
where although importing public administration theory to explain presidency-centric phenomena has become a 
somewhat standard practice (Arnold 1998; Robinson 2004; Hult and Walcott 2004; Walcott and Hult 1987, 1995, 
2005; Vaughn and Villalobos 2009), studies on the managerial dimensions of the presidency have focused almost 
entirely on descriptive treatments of institutional arrangements, structural evolution, and personnel dynamics (e.g., 
Burke 2000; Patterson 1988, 2001; Kumar and Sullivan 2003).
In this study, we address this gap by applying a robust theoretical model to explain the dynamics that shape 
assessments of White House chief of staff management.  The main contributions of this approach are three-fold: 
first, it extends the application of an established theoretical model to managerial rather than organizational-level 
performance; second, it expands the theoretical paradigms of public management into the analysis of the U.S. 
presidency; and, third, it yields important insights not only into management in the modern presidency, but also the 
political dynamics of administrative leadership more generally, with prospects for future application to other 
political institutions.
We conduct our study by applying measures of former White House officials’ perceptions derived from the Chief of 
Staff Project (COSP) (Cohen 2002) to the key theoretical dimensions of the public management model developed by 
Kenneth J. Meier and Lawrence J. O’Toole, Jr. (Meier and O’Toole 2001, 2004; O’Toole and Meier 1999, 2003), 
hereafter referred to as the ‘MO model.’  The MO model is particularly useful for our purposes here as it allows 
scholars to identify the ways in which key management concepts affect managerial performance.  In addition, by 
employing former White House officials’ perceptions for our analyses, we are able to access indicators of influence 
otherwise unattainable.  Our findings indicate that the core theoretical components of the MO model serve as robust 
predictors of individual-level dynamics that drive perceptions of managerial influence as they relate to executive 
performance.
Managerial Influence: Theory and Empirics
Every president since Richard Nixon has relied on a chief of staff (see Table 1).  As Bradley Patterson (2001, pp. 
119, 348) notes, chiefs of staff are burdened with the job of managing ‘the whole institution of the White House,’ 
essentially serving as a ‘system manager: boss of none, but overseer of everything.’  In other words, the White 
House chief of staff is the individual responsible for managing the bureaucracy that the president commands; the 
importance of the position is underscored by a rich body of scholarly knowledge about what it is chiefs of staff do 
(see Cohen 2002 for an extensive review).  For instance, some scholars have examined the traditional roles of the 
chief of staff (e.g., administrator, advisor, guardian) and concluded that ‘chiefs of staff who are effective in their 
major duties will have a positive impact on the administration’ (Cohen 2002, p. 480; see also Cohen and Krause 
2000; Cohen, Dolan, and Rosati 2002; Cohen, Hult, and Walcott 2012, Cohen, Vaughn, and Villalobos 2012).  
These major duties consist of a blend between managing and coordinating the administrative structure of the 
institutional presidency.  In addition, chiefs of staff have been observed in the manner they sometimes become more 
directly involved with the work they oversee, such as in helping with negotiations on Capitol Hill (Patterson 2001, 
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pp. 119-21).  Nevertheless, attempts to examine chief of staff influence in a systematic manner have remained 
elusive.  Here, we contend that the theoretical tools needed to begin producing this systematic, empirical knowledge 
already exist in public administration theory, particularly within the field of public management.  Specifically, we 
argue that the leading determinants of organizational performance can also help explain the influence key managers 
in both public and political institutions wield within their organizations.  This includes the White House chief of 
staff position, which represents arguably the highest ranking administrative position in a political institution in the 
United States.
[Insert Table 1 here]
To demonstrate this, we employ the MO model, which provides a platform for developing a rich theoretical 
explanation for the determinants of managerial influence and how they relate to administrative performance. In 
developing the MO model, Meier and O’Toole condense several decades of accumulated knowledge into a testable 
theory that identifies key factors related to organizational performance.  In brief, the theory holds that organizational 
performance is a function of stability, internal and external management dynamics, and environmental factors. The 
thrust of the argument is that management matters; that is, leadership efforts made by organizational elites to 
maintain stability, exploit opportunities, and buffer organizational assets have an indelible impact on an 
organization’s ability to serve its purpose.  Whereas Meier and O’Toole (2007) have focused their efforts to explore 
the production of performance at an organizational level, we expand the model’s reach to examine managerial-level 
performance metrics.  In that vein, we build on Meier and O’Toole’s previous work by focusing our efforts on an 
empirical examination of the various components of their theory, which is expressed in mathematical form as 
follows:
Ot = ȕ1(S + M1) Ot-1 ȕ2(Xt/S)(M3/M4İ t
For this equation, O denotes a measure for organizational performance, S is a measure of stability, and M denotes 
management.  Internal management (M1) denotes management’s contribution to stability through alterations to 
organizational structure and operations. External management (M2) represents a balance between an organization’s 
networking versus risk-averse buffering efforts.  Although M2 is not explicitly included in the MO model, its two 
components—M3 and M4—are featured independently, with M3 representing managerial efforts to exploit the 
environment of the organization, and M4 representing managerial efforts to buffer the unit from environmental 
influences.  X is a vector of environmental forces, İLVDQHUURUWHUPWKHRWKHUVXEVFULSWVGHQRWHWLPHSHULRGVDQGȕ1
DQGȕ2 are estimable parameters.  In all, the components of the MO model described above hold that organizational 
performance is a function of how management balances internal dynamics with a diffuse external environment.
Our study focuses on examining managerial influence, which signifies a major dimension of chief of staff 
performance that can be explained by the same factors previous research has shown drives organizational 
performance.  We base this contention on the logic that the role managers play (i.e., in applying a particular 
organizational structure and coordinating style, affecting relations between personnel, controlling and vetting 
information flow and access, etc.) collectively captures a significant share of what shapes overall White House 
performance.   Indeed, as Walcott and Hult (1995, 2005; see also Hult and Walcott 2004) note, chief of staff 
performance is largely dependent on the chief’s ability to leverage the strengths of the organization and external 
assets against internal challenges and outside forces, such that performance depends on being able to harness 
resources, navigate the encroaching organizational and oppositional hurdles, and ultimately produce achievements.  
From a personnel perspective, how staff members ultimately evaluate a manager should largely depend on how well 
they perceive managers are able to wield influence to meet the various expectations that come with such a role.  
Thus, just as key managerial dynamics affect the way institutions perform, so too should those same dynamics 
reflect how influential managers are perceived in their attempts to lead their organizations.
With respect to the position of chief of staff, no individual is better situated to influence the operation of a 
presidency, particularly given the gatekeeper role that provides full access to the president and the ability to control 
the access of other White House officials.  The administrative position and gatekeeper role allow chiefs of staff to 
have a great amount of influence over the information flow and processes that presidents employ to make many of 
the decisions that shape executive performance.  In the spirit of Light’s (1984, p. 18) definition of influence as ‘an 
advisor’s ability to change outcomes from what they would have been,’ we connect chief of staff influence to White 
House organizational performance.  Accordingly, we test the extent to which variables representing the key 
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theoretical components of the MO model, along with a number of contextual variables, drive White House personnel 
perceptions concerning a chief of staff’s administrative influence as a proxy for White House organizational 
performance.
Hypotheses
The hypotheses we test in this study derive directly from the key components of the previously introduced MO 
model, the first of which is stability.  Stability (S) refers to those elements that minimize interruptions in 
bureaucratic production and promote ‘constancy in the design, functioning, and direction of an administrative 
system over time’ (Meier and O’Toole 2007, p. 506).  O’Toole and Meier (2003) identify five separate types of 
stability: structural, mission, production (or technology), procedural, and personnel.  Here, we focus on structural 
stability vis-à-vis White House organization as well as personnel stability as it relates to chief of staff experience, 
presidential experience, the chief of staff’s working relationship with the president, and the chief of staff’s working 
relationship with Congress.
Regarding how White House organization, as a measure of structural stability, may affect perceptions of chief of 
staff influence, we expect those who work for a chief of staff within a more clear-cut, hierarchical structure (rather 
than a less structured, ‘spokes-of-the-wheel’ approach) are more likely to have to depend on the chief of staff to get 
to the president.  Similarly, a more hierarchical approach makes a president more reliant on the chief of staff to 
manage and control information flow. Accordingly, we hypothesize the more hierarchical the organization of the 
White House, the more influential the chief of staff is likely to be perceived (H1).
Another important factor that may condition chief of staff influence is experience.  In referencing the benefits of 
experience, O’Toole and Meier (2003, p. 47) point out that ‘multifaceted skills acquired in the trenches can make a 
significant difference in performance.’  For our purposes, experience is defined as a chief of staff’s general political
background prior to coming to the White House.  A lack of political experience may result in a learning period in a 
president’s term during which a less experienced chief of staff may need to test numerous administrative approaches 
before settling on a particular managerial strategy.  For personnel working in close quarters with a chief of staff who 
is unfamiliar with one’s duties, managerial mistakes and changes in approach may lead to an unstable working 
environment characterized by a chief of staff who struggles to juggle the many managerial tasks at hand while trying 
to become familiar with the political games of the Beltway.  Accordingly, we generally expect the more experience 
a chief of staff had in the political arena prior to one’s tenure, the more influential the chief of staff is likely to be 
perceived (H2a).  On the other hand, when considering presidential experience as it relates to chief of staff 
influence, it may be that a more experienced president is less likely to rely on the chief of staff such that the more 
experience a president had in the political arena prior to becoming president, the less influential his chief of staff is 
likely to be perceived (H2b).
Regarding a chief of staff’s relationship with the president and Congress, we generally expect chiefs of staff with a 
more positive reputation in their dealings with both their boss and lawmakers in Congress are more likely to be able 
to engage with and influence such political actors.  Accordingly, we expect the better the general working 
relationship between a chief of staff and a president, the more influential the chief of staff is likely to be perceived
(H3a) and the better the general working relationship between a chief of staff and Congress, the more influential the 
chief of staff is likely to be perceived (H3b).
With respect to internal management (M1), our focus here lies in determining the extent to which perceptions 
concerning more centralized chief of staff approaches tend to correlate positively with perceptions of managerial 
influence.  It should be noted that this approach is different from testing the effects of actual measures of 
centralization (see Ponder 2000; Rudalevige 2002; Villalobos 2013).  Although centralization is intrinsic to 
hierarchy, this study distinguishes between hierarchy as a perceptual measure of how structural stability affects the 
environment a chief of staff operates within versus perceptions of the type of centralized (or decentralized) role a 
chief of staff embraces in carrying out one’s managerial duties. Accordingly, in terms of a chief of staff’s 
administrative role, centralization depends on the extent to which a chief of staff is perceived as willing and able to 
coordinate the workings of the administration.  We contend that personnel are likely to perceive chiefs of staff who 
seem to eschew their coordinating responsibilities as less influential compared to those who strongly embrace the 
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role and attempt to use it as a means to direct the administrative agenda in a more straightforward, stable manner.  
Accordingly, we hypothesize the more a chief of staff embraces one’s coordinating responsibilities, the more 
influential the chief of staff is likely to be perceived (H4).
Closely related to a chief of staff’s administrative role is management style, which may vary from a hands-on chief 
of staff who spends a large amount of time on White House management issues to a chief of staff who prefers to 
delegate managerial responsibilities, the latter of which can lead to less stable structure and operations.  Thus, we 
expect the more a chief of staff tends towards a hands-on management style, the more influential the chief of staff is 
likely to be perceived (H5a).  In particular, a chief might be especially influential if the president prefers to delegate 
and therefore provides the chief of staff with greater discretion in directing White House operations.  As such, we 
further hypothesize the less a president tends towards a hands-on management style, the more influential the chief of 
staff is likely to be perceived (H5b).
Our measures for networking (M3) concern the extent to which personnel have access to both the chief of staff and 
the president.  Opportunities derived (or restricted) due to accessibility may affect the extent to which personnel can 
advocate their preferences, provide advice and input for the decision-making process, and take on more 
responsibilities for an administration.  We expect that a more accessible chief is more likely to be attentive in 
dealing with other personnel and involved in administrative affairs, thereby gaining a reputation for being a major 
player in an administration.  Accordingly, we hypothesize the more accessible a chief of staff is, the more influential 
the chief of staff is likely to be perceived (H6a).  Similarly, the less accessible the president, the more personnel staff 
may look to and depend on the chief of staff, and vice-versa.  As such, we expect the less accessible a president is, 
the more influential the chief of staff is likely to be perceived (H6b).  Accessibility aside, we also employ a chief of 
staff’s level of visibility as an indicator of how well known and influential one is within an administration.  
Accordingly, we posit the more visible a chief of staff is as a public spokesperson for an administration, the more 
influential the chief of staff is likely to be perceived (H7).
With respect to buffering (M4), we consider the manner in which a chief of staff may serve as a proxy for the 
president in order to perform tasks the president may be reluctant to perform himself, such as fighting political 
battles on behalf of the president and/or seeking to draw blame and criticism away from the president to protect that 
president’s political interests.  We also consider the extent to which a chief of staff may act as a ‘reality-tester’ by 
attempting to minimize a president’s vulnerability to potential policy/political hazards by keeping the president fully 
informed of an administration’s progress rather than trying to shield the president from any negative developments.  
As such, we hypothesize the more a chief of staff acts as a guardian or proxy for the president, the more influential 
the chief of staff is likely to be perceived (H8) and the more a chief of staff acts as a reality-tester for the president 
by actively attempting to warn the president of potential policy/political hazards, the more influential the chief of 
staff is likely to be perceived (H9).
Finally, the model accounts for the manner an organization’s environment (X)—that is, contextual factors such as 
constraints, resources, and external demands—may shape performance.  For this, we develop several additional 
theoretical expectations, including: the organizational proximity between White House personnel and the chief of 
staff, whether government was divided, whether a major crisis took place during a chief of staff’s tenure, and the 
manner in which presidential approval may have transferred to a particular chief.  With regards to proximity, we 
expect a staffer’s institutional position within the executive branch in relation to where the chief of staff operates 
within the White House may affect one’s perception of chief of staff influence.  Specifically, those proximate to the 
chief of staff are more likely to observe the chief of staff’s efforts, as well as instances where the president looks to 
the chief for help and advice. As per the makeup of Congress, chiefs of staff serving at a time of divided 
government may find themselves more immersed in political negotiations with legislative opponents than those 
serving a president with majority support in the legislative branch.  Accordingly, the additional challenges faced by 
a president under divided government may lead to greater dependence upon the chief of staff, which should increase 
perceptions of chief of staff influence.  In addition, if a chief of staff is serving at a time of a major foreign policy 
crisis, such an event may have a significant influence on the manner in which one perceives the president and key 
members of the administration.  Generally speaking, we expect White House personnel are likely to rally around a 
chief of staff during a time of crisis as a show of in-group unity, thereby bolstering the chief’s perceived level of 
influence.  Finally, the extent to which the public approves of the president’s overall job performance (Edwards 
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1990; Brace and Hinckley 1992, 1993) may also spill over to affect a staffer’s perceptions concerning chief of staff 
performance.  Indeed, if the president is experiencing exceptionally high (or low) approval ratings, staff may 
connect such appraisals to the role the chief of staff has played in helping to run the administration.
Using the MO Model and COSP Survey Data to Examine Managerial Influence
The abstract nature of the MO model allows scholars to apply it to many different organizations for a variety of 
purposes, operationalizing performance as appropriate based on the function of the bureaucratic organization under 
examination and the nature of the research question.  Indeed, in previous studies, the MO model has generated 
hypotheses for testing the determinants of organizational performance for bureaucracies as disparate as Texas school 
districts (Meier and O’Toole 2001, 2002, 2003), law enforcement agencies (Nicholson-Crotty and O’Toole 2004), 
and a wide assortment of municipal government services in the United Kingdom (Andrews et al. 2005).  Here, by 
matching the key components of the MO model with measures of chief of staff-specific indicators, we are able to 
ensure a meaningful correspondence between the theoretical underpinnings of the model and the analyses reported 
in this study.
Because so much of what the chief of staff does happens behind closed doors, our use of former administration 
officials’ perceptions provides us with a unique opportunity to uncover important new insights concerning the key 
factors that shape chief of staff managerial influence.  Our approach falls in line with previous research 
demonstrating correlations between perceptual managerial and organizational performance indicators.  Several 
studies indicate organizational performance may be predicted by a variety of perceptual managerial measures, 
including human resource management (Huselid 1995; Delaney and Huselid 1996), human capital measures (Gates 
and Langevin 2010), human resource bundles (MacDuffie 1995), intellectual capital indicators in management 
accounting (Tayles et al. 2007), employee motivations (DeVoe and Iyengar 2004), and organizational citizenship 
behaviors (Turnipseed and Rassuli 2005).  Nevertheless, as with all observational studies, one should keep in mind 
that although variability on the dependent and independent variables between cases allows for an informed 
evaluation of the potential causal effects of our independent variables on chief of staff influence, our study does not 
include a pre-test/post-test structure (as in a controlled experiment) such that one cannot unequivocally confirm 
unidirectional causality for correlational relationships.  Moreover, by employing White House staffers’ perceptions 
of chief of staff influence we do not claim or imply that such measures represent actual chief of staff influence.  
Rather, our use of White House staff perceptions provide valuable proxy measures for better understanding White 
House organizational performance across different chiefs of staff and administrations.  The inferences drawn from 
our findings and conclusions are reported within such confines and should be interpreted accordingly.
For our purposes, we match conceptually consistent data measuring White House personnel perceptions of chief of 
staff influence to the various nodes of the MO Model using the Chief of Staff Project (COSP) survey data.  The 
COSP questionnaire was mailed in two stages to individuals listed in the White House Office (special assistant level 
and above), select positions within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) (i.e., Chair of the Council of 
Economic Advisers, Office of Management and Budget Director and Deputy Director, and the U.S. Representative
to the United Nations), and cabinet and deputy cabinet officials that served in the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and 
Clinton administrations.
The United States Government Manual was used as the primary source for determining COSP survey recipients.  
Respondents were asked to complete a 67-question survey for each chief of staff with whom they worked.  Of the 
776 individuals who were mailed surveys, 198 returned them, for an overall response rate of 25.5% (see Table 2 for 
a breakdown of personnel by administration and position served).  Former Clinton officials had a 21.4% response 
rate, while 29.5% of the former Reagan-Bush officials who received questionnaires returned them.  Some of these 
individuals served more than one chief of staff and/or position such that our sample constituted a total of 336 
observations.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Within our sample, there was only one person for the White House/Cabinet Mixed position, leading us to exclude 
this position from the data analyses to avoid drawing any unreliable or invalid inferences from our findings.  In 
addition, there were also a number of missing responses for some of the survey questions, resulting in an N of 296 
for our main analyses.
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As previously mentioned, in explaining the determinants of managerial perceptions, we focus here on how key 
factors shape perceptions of chief of staff influence.  Using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from no influence (1) 
to extremely influential (7), we measure perceptions of chief of staff influence in our analysis by asking: ‘In sum, on 
a scale of 1 to 7, how much influence do you feel the COS [chief of staff] had while serving in the Administration?’  
All of our other main variables taken from the COSP questionnaire are measured in similar fashion (a supplemental
appendix containing the full questionnaire is available at http://works.bepress.com/jdvillalobos/ and upon request).
In addition to the questionnaire measures, we also include measures of several key contextual factors mentioned 
above.  For our measure of proximity to the chief of staff, we construct an ordinal control variable that measures the 
proximity to the chief of staff, where ‘1’ denotes a cabinet level position, ‘2’ denotes a mixed position, and ‘3’ 
denotes a White House level position.  Next, we measure divided government as a dichotomous variable where ‘1’ 
denotes a time period for which divided government was present for the majority of a chief of staff’s tenure and ‘0’ 
otherwise.  For the presence of a crisis, we assign a code of ‘1’ for which a respondent who experiences at least one 
major foreign policy crisis during their tenure serving under a chief of staff and ‘0’ otherwise.
Last, we measure presidential approval as the overall average percentage change for the duration of a given chief of 
staff’s tenure in serving a president.  Since the survey questions measure perceptions of a chief of staff’s 
performance for the total time serving a given president, we operationalize our presidential approval measure to 
reflect aggregate measures of average change.  Unfortunately, we are thus unable to disaggregate our presidential 
approval measures to reflect monthly or yearly changes in perception.  Nevertheless, the multiple numbers of 
respondents for each of the chiefs we examine (e.g., 50 respondents for Leon Panetta) allows us to conduct robust 
cross-sectional analyses across multiple administrations and varying environmental conditions.
Results
Our analyses examine the tenures of ten White House chiefs of staff across three administrations from 1981 to 2001.  
For our main model, we estimate the data using ordered logit since our dependent variable is an ordinal survey 
response measure.  We report robust standard errors clustered by chief of staff.  Our unit of analysis is the response 
of a given former White House staff member.  To account for any possible issues with endogeneity or 
multicollinearity in the data, we assessed the variance inflation factor (VIF) for our model to verify the validity and 
reliability of our empirical approach.  The mean VIF value for our model is 1.98 and thus well below the VIF value 
of 10 that scholars consider to be the excess point for multicollinearity (Tables A1-A16 in the aforementioned 
supplemental appendix provide further information detailing the pair-wise correlations, descriptive statistics, and 
frequency distributions for all of our main variables).
The results for our main model shown in Table 3 suggest that some managerial dimensions matter more than others 
in determining perceptions of chief of staff influence.  In particular, measures representing both stability (S) and 
external management (M2) exhibited statistically significant relationships with our dependent variable, including: 
White House organization, a chief of staff’s working relationship with both the president and Congress, the 
accessibility of both the chief of staff and the president, as well as measures of chief of staff visibility, guardianship 
of the president, and role as the president’s reality-tester.  Concerning our environmental controls, we also find that 
proximity, divided government, and the presence of a crisis further condition such perceptions.  At the same time, 
none of our internal management (M1) measures are related in a statistically significant way with chief of staff 
influence.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Regarding managerial stability, we find that the structural design in White House Organization, a chief of staff’s 
relationship with the president, and the chief’s relationship with Congress each significantly affect perceptions of 
chief of staff influence.  Specifically, the minimum to maximum predicted probability results suggest that working 
within a more hierarchical organization may increase perceptions of chief of staff influence by 15.88 percentage 
points (p < .001).  Meanwhile, the predictive probability results also suggest that chiefs having an excellent 
relationship with the president and Congress may increase perceptions of chief of staff influence by 23.23 (p < .001) 
and 10.1 (p < .05) percentage points, respectively.  These results corroborate H1, H3a, and H3b.
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With regards to networking, the minimum to maximum predictive probability results indicate that chiefs of staff 
who are highly accessible are 6.01 percentage points more likely to be considered influential in networking directly 
with staff than those who are not (p < .05) while higher levels of presidential accessibility can limit a chief’s ability 
to serve as a gatekeeper and may thereby lower perceptions of chief of staff influence by about 6.62 percentage 
points (p < .05), thus corroborating H6a and H6b.  Regarding our third networking measure, we find that a chief of 
staff’s visibility as a spokesman for the administration can further increase perceptions of their administrative 
influence.  Specifically, the minimum to maximum predictive probability results indicate that extremely visible 
chiefs of staff are 15.51 percentage points more likely to be considered influential than less visible chiefs (p < .001), 
which corroborates H7.
Concerning our two buffering measures, we find that both chief of staff guardianship and a chief of staff’s role in 
serving as a reality-tester have a suggestive, though only marginally significant (p < .1), impact on enhancing 
officials’ perceptions of chief of staff influence in an administration.  In line with our expectations for H8, the 
minimum to maximum predictive probability results indicate that a chief of staff who acts largely as a guardian or 
proxy for the president is 8.52 percentage points more likely to be considered influential than one who does not.  
Likewise, in line with H9, the minimum to maximum predictive probability results indicate that chiefs who take on 
the role of reality-tester by actively attempting to warn the president of potential policy/political hazards are 10.91 
percentage points more likely to be considered influential than those who do not embrace such role.
Managerial components aside, the results for our contextual variables suggest that closer proximity to the chief of 
staff may increase perceptions of influence while the presence of a crisis may lower perceptions, though these 
findings are only marginally significant (p < .1).  More notably, our results show that a state of divided government 
increases the likelihood that a chief of staff will be perceived as more aggressively involved in dealing with 
congressional opponents and working to move the president’s policy agenda through the legislative arena.  
Specifically, the minimum to maximum predictive probability results indicate that chiefs working during a state of 
divided government are about 8.98 percentage points more likely to be considered highly influential than those 
serving under a state of unified government (p < .05).  These findings fall in line with transaction cost models of 
decision making for which one would expect the president to increase centralization of the policy process—often by 
employing the chief of staff to serve as a key negotiator—in competing with the legislative branch for control over 
policy development and, later, bureaucratic entities answering to multiple principals at the implementation stage.
MO Model Applicability (Sensitivity Analysis)
Apart from the main analysis we conduct to test our hypotheses, we also conduct a sensitivity analysis that employs 
index measures for each of the MO model components in order to test the validity of applying the MO model as our 
framework.  To do this, we first performed an oblique rotation factor analysis for our main survey-based measures to 
determine how well the variables load—that is, how highly correlated they are with each of their corresponding MO 
model component subcategories (e.g., stability, internal management, networking, and buffering).  The results of our
factor analysis demonstrate that ten of our thirteen items loaded highly on their respective factors (see Table 4).
[Insert Tables 4-5 here]
To conduct a follow-up sensitivity analysis, we next constructed index measures for each of the MO component 
subcategories, leaving out the items that did not load well (< .5).  We then ran a new ordered logit regression 
analysis using the index measures for each of the MO model components and our environmental controls.  The 
results of this sensitivity analysis were largely consistent and, in fact, stronger than that of our main model, thereby 
corroborating our application of the MO model framework in this study (see Table 5).
Discussion and Conclusion
Our study contributes to the literature on public management in a variety of ways.  First, we have extended the 
application of an established theoretical model to managerial rather than organizational-level performance.  We have 
also expanded the increasingly vital theoretical paradigms of public management into the field of presidential 
studies, thereby also extending management theory into the analysis of political institutions.  Consequently, our 
study has yielded suggestive and important insights not only about management in the modern presidency but also 
the political dynamics of administrative leadership more generally.  Furthermore, our findings and insights have 
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normative merit for policy makers, practitioners, and White House personnel interested in social science research 
concerning the traits, characteristics, and management practices that shape White House policy and political 
processes.  As such, the application and expansion of our approach—both with respect to the White House as well as 
other organizational entities—provides a new template for better assessing managerial performance, one that moves 
away from the speculation so often circulated publicly by the media (or otherwise spread privately among key 
insiders) and more towards a systemic, objective means of evaluation.
In light of these findings, future studies should consider whether the general relationships identified here persist or 
change in important ways by expanding the application of our survey measures to include more recent chiefs of staff 
and developing and applying alternative chief of staff (and other White House) managerial performance measures.  
Subsequent survey samples should also extend beyond the White House proper to include a greater number of 
Cabinet members and their deputies.  Scholars could then further examine the effect that proximity may have on 
personnel perceptions assuming that perceptions more closely track actual influence over outcomes for observers 
closer to the action.  Scholars should likewise delve more deeply into the connections and distinctions between 
perceptual and direct performance indicators, including factors that can be objectively coded such as 
internal/external centralization of the policy process or political experience.  Regarding the latter, one might 
consider the general correspondence and relative differences between the subjective, 7-point scale measures of 
presidential and chief of staff political experience we employ versus observable indicators measured in years (Tables 
A17-A33 in our supplemental appendix provide a full account of such measure comparisons, a list of all observed 
indicators, and the relevant descriptive statistics, both overall as well as individually for each of the presidents and 
chiefs of staff included in the analyses presented in this article).
Although not idiosyncratic, observable indicators may be limited in capturing the relative scope and significance of 
the kind of experience brought to the table in the way subjective perceptions can.  For instance, Erskine Bowles had 
only four observable years of notable political experience prior to becoming chief of staff that included serving two 
years as White House Deputy Chief of Staff, reflected by a score of 4.06 (out of 7) from his peers on our subjective 
scale.  By comparison, although Thomas McLarty logged more than twice as many observable years of prior 
political experience, his record rested on relatively less notable or relevant positions, including state legislator in 
Arkansas, chairman of the Arkansas State Democratic Party, and treasurer for Bill Clinton’s failed gubernatorial bid 
in 1980, reflected by a lower score of 2.58 on our subjective scale.  Given such comparative differences, the pros 
and cons of employing subjective versus objective measures for political experience (and other managerial 
performance indicators) merit further scholarly debate.
Researchers should also continue to explore other dimensions of chief of staff influence.  For example, it would be 
interesting to examine differences in perceptions across policy domains.  Given previous research on measures of 
presidential performance and accountability in the domestic versus foreign policy realms, much remains to be 
uncovered with respect to managerial questions across both domains.  Scholars may also consider the manner in 
which chiefs of staff wield their influence.  For instance, future studies may explore the difference between those 
chiefs of staff who take on a ‘neutral broker’ versus ‘self-advocate’ approach to managing the White House.  Chiefs 
serving as neutral brokers presumably fit the mold of the ‘passion for anonymity’ that is often tied to public 
administrators who place organizational goals above politics and their own political agendas (Brownlow 1958).  
Meanwhile, chiefs of staff who act as self-advocates likely wield influence as power to affect outcomes, either with 
the primary intent to benefit their own agendas (which may not always be of benefit to overall organizational 
performance; e.g., Donald Regan) or perhaps to increase and maintain control of the bureaucratic apparatus with the 
primary intent to protect the interests of the White House and maximize organizational performance.
Scholars could further consider the differences between a chief of staff’s political and policy influence in advising 
the president.  In terms of how personnel view chief of staff managerial approaches, scholars may also move beyond 
general perceptions of overall influence to explore whether and to what extent White House officials vary in their 
perceptions of what constitutes a ‘properly balanced’ management approach (e.g., perhaps one that is neither too 
centralized nor too inattentive to subordinates’ performance).  Last, with regards to theory, scholars may also 
consider other literature employing different branches of public administration research, particularly pertaining to 
principal-agent models and studies on organizational hierarchy and information flow (e.g., Hammond and Miller 
1985; Miller 1993; Wood and Waterman 1994; Hammond and Knott 1996; Waterman and Meier 1998; see also 
Rudalevige 2005; Walcott and Hult 2005).
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Future research could deepen understanding of how chiefs operate within the bureaucratic apparatus, how a chief’s 
perceived managerial behavior and strategies reflect overall organizational performance perceptions and, ultimately, 
how such dynamics connect and contribute to tangible bureaucratic outputs and outcomes.  In particular, this area of 
research will benefit greatly if scholars continue moving towards more direct measures of the dynamics that shape 
managerial performance, a more nuanced consideration of the relationship between perceptual performance 
measures and actual management practices and outputs, and more careful approximation and anchoring of such 
factors and their casual mechanisms.
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Table 1 White House Chiefs of Staff in the Modern Era, 1969-2014*
Chief of Staff Tenure President Party
Harry Robbins Haldeman 1969-73 Richard M. Nixon Republican
Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 1973-74 Richard M. Nixon Republican
Donald H. Rumsfeld 1974-75 Gerald Ford Republican
Richard M. Cheney 1975-77 Gerald Ford Republican
William H.M. Jordan 1979-80 Jimmy Carter Democrat
Jack H. Watson, Jr. 1980-81 Jimmy Carter Democrat
James A. Baker III 1981-85 Ronald Reagan Republican
Donald T. Regan 1985-87 Ronald Reagan Republican
Howard H. Baker, Jr. 1987-88 Ronald Reagan Republican
Kenneth M. Duberstein 1988-89 Ronald Reagan Republican
John H. Sununu 1989-91 George H.W. Bush Republican
Samuel K. Skinner 1991-92 George H.W. Bush Republican
James A. Baker III** 1992-93 George H.W. Bush Republican
Thomas F. McLarty III 1993-94 Bill Clinton Democrat
Leon E. Panetta 1994-97 Bill Clinton Democrat
Erskine B. Bowles 1997-98 Bill Clinton Democrat
John D. Podesta 1998-01 Bill Clinton Democrat
Andrew H. Card, Jr. 2001-06 George W. Bush Republican
Joshua B. Bolten 2006-09 George W. Bush Republican
Rahm I. Emanuel*** 2009-10 Barack Obama Democrat
William M. Daley 2011-12 Barack Obama Democrat
Jacob Lew 2012-13 Barack Obama Democrat
Denis McDonough 2013-present Barack Obama Democrat
*COSP data includes personnel for those chiefs of staff shown in bold text.
**James Baker’s brief second stint as chief of staff is excluded from our analyses.
***After Emanuel left his post to run for mayor of Chicago, Peter M. Rouse stepped in briefly 
as ‘acting’ chief of staff from October 1, 2010 to January 13, 2011.
Table 2 Chief of Staff Project (COSP): Personnel by Position Level
Position Level Reagan Bush Clinton Total 
White House Assistant 30 11 35 76
White House Deputy Assistant 28 17 47 92
White House Special Assistant 49 12 48 109
White House Mixed 3 0 2 5
White House/Cabinet Mixed 1 0 0 1
Inner Cabinet 2 1 0 3
Inner Cabinet Deputy 2 0 5 7
Outer Cabinet 3 4 5 12
Outer Cabinet Deputy 6 5 20 31
Total 123 50 162 336
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Table 3 Examining Perceptions of Chief of Staff Influence (Ordered Logit Regression with Robust Standard 
Errors Clustered by COS)
Independent Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max +-sd/2
Stability (S)
White House Organization .419*** (.129) 3.26 .1588 .0402
COS Experience -.032 (.111) -.29 - -
POTUS Experience .075 (.234) .32 - -
COS Working Relationship w/POTUS 1.021*** (.143) 7.14 .2323 .0682
COS Working Relationship w/Congress .254** (.11) 2.31 .1010 .0274
Internal Management (M1)
COS Administrator Role .156 (.182) .86 - -
COS Management Style .04 (.077) .53 - -
POTUS Management Style -.04 (.076) -.52 - -
External Management (M2)
COS Accessibility (M3) .149** (.09) 1.66 .0601 .0157
POTUS Accessibility (M3) -.178** (.086) -2.09 .0662 .0218
COS Visibility (M3) .414*** (.121) 3.43 .1551 .0422
COS Guardianship (M4) .213* (.133) 1.60 .0852 .0200
COS Reality-Tester (M4) .275* (.203) 1.36 .1091 .0280
Environmental Controls (X)
Proximity to the COS .258* (.197) 1.31 .0348 .0117
Divided Government (1,0) 1.312** (.664) 1.98 .0898 NA†
Crisis (1,0) -.536* (.326) -1.65 .0357 NA†
Presidential Approval -.047 (.358) -.13 - -
N 296
Pseudo R2 .3577
Dependent Variable: In sum, on a scale of 1 to 7, how much influence do you feel the COS [chief of staff] had 
while serving in the Administration?
† The predicted probability score for a half standard deviation above and below the mean is not applicable for the 
significant results of this variable since it is dichotomous.
p < .1*, p < .05**, p < .001***
Table 4 Oblique Rotation Factor Analysis
Factor 1 (S) Uniqueness
White House Organization .5239 .7266
Chief of Staff Experience .8249 .3262  
POTUS Experience -.0926 .0884
COS Working Rel. w/POTUS .5973 .4922
COS Working Rel. w/Congress .8424 .2985
Factor 2 (M1) Uniqueness
COS Administrator Role .8415 .2402
COS Management Style .8761 .2229
POTUS Management Style .0070 .0288
Factor 3 (M3) Uniqueness
COS Accessibility .8595 .2210
POTUS Accessibility .9033 .1994
COS Visibility .0125 .3751
Factor 4 (M4) Uniqueness
COS Guardianship .8210 .3261
COS Reality-Tester .8563 .2700
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Table 5 Chief of Staff Influence Sensitivity Analysis with Index Measures (Ordered Logit Regression with 
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by COS)
Independent Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max +-sd/2
MO Model Components
Stability (S) 1.02*** (.217) 4.70 .2384 .0712
Internal Mgt. (M1) .271** (.142) 1.91 .0996 .0209
External Mgt. Networking (M3) .273** (.14) 1.94 .0986 .0149
External Mgt. Buffering (M4) .728*** (.174) 4.19 .2178 .0628
Environmental Controls (X)
Proximity to the COS .28** (.127) 2.21 .0380 .0128
Divided Government (1,0) 1.4* (1.042) 1.34 .0955 NA†
Crisis (1,0) -.382** (.223) -1.71 .0254 NA†
Presidential Approval .31 (.539) .58 - -
N 296
Pseudo R2 .2971
Dependent Variable: In sum, on a scale of 1 to 7, how much influence do you feel the COS [chief of staff] had 
while serving in the Administration?
† The predicted probability score for a half standard deviation above and below the mean is not applicable for the 
significant results of this variable since it is dichotomous.
p < .1*, p < .05**, p < .001***
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SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX*
WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF PROJECT:
COSP Questionnaire Guide (Likert Scale)
We provide below the general introductory material used for the questionnaire, followed by the specific 
questions applicable to this study.  The entire questionnaire that includes other items not applied to this particular 
study is available upon request.
Biographical Information:
Please list the titles and roles that you held, and the duties you performed, while serving in the _______ 
administration, while ________ was Chief of Staff (COS), and the approximate dates of your service in each of 
those capacities:
Instructions:
For each of the following questions, please circle a number between 1 and 7 which best represents your opinion. All 
answers to this survey will remain confidential (unless you specify otherwise). There is space at the bottom of each 
section in which you can make additional comments/suggestions if you would like.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
COS General Influence:
In sum, on a scale of 1 to 7, how much influence do you feel the COS had while serving in the administration?
Not Influential Extremely Influential
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
COS Experience:
On a scale of 1 to 7, how would you characterize the COS’s general political background prior to becoming 
COS (i.e., how much experience did the COS have in the political arena before becoming COS?)?
No Political Experience Very Politically Experienced
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
POTUS Experience:
On a scale of 1 to 7, how would you characterize the President’s general political background prior to 
becoming President (i.e., how much experience did the President have in the political arena before becoming 
President?)?
No Political Experience Very Politically Experienced
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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White House Organization:
On a scale of 1 to 7, how would you characterize the organization of the White House—hierarchical, with a 
strong COS in charge, a spokes-of-the-wheel system in which the president operated as his own COS, or 
something in between?
Spokes of the Wheel Hierarchical
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
COS Working Relationship w/POTUS:
On a scale of 1 to 7, how would you characterize the COS’s general working relationship with the President?
Poor Excellent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
COS Working Relationship w/POTUS:
On a scale of 1 to 7, how would you characterize the COS’s general working relationship with the Congress?
Poor Excellent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
COS Administrator Role:
On a scale of 1 to 7, to what extent did the COS attempt to coordinate the White House administrative process 
(e.g., overseeing the President’s schedule; ensuring the smooth operation of the White House)?
Not A Coordinator Very Much A Coordinator
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
COS Accessibility:
On a scale of 1 to 7, how accessible was the COS to you?
Not Accessible Extremely Accessible
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
POTUS Accessibility:
On a scale of 1 to 7, how accessible was the President to you?
Not Accessible Extremely Accessible
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
COS Management Style:
On a scale of 1 to 7, how would you characterize the COS’s general style of managing the White House (i.e., 
how much time and involvement was spent by the COS on White House management issues?)?
Delegating Hands-On
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
POTUS Management Style:
On a scale of 1 to 7, how would you characterize the President’s general style of managing the White House 
(i.e., how much time and involvement was spent by the President on White House management issues?)?
Delegating Hands-On
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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COS Visibility:
On a scale of 1 to 7, how would you characterize the COS’s visibility as a public spokesman for the 
Administration?
Not Visible Extremely Visible
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
COS Guardianship:
On a scale of 1 to 7, to what extent was the COS a proxy for the president who, among other things, performed 
tasks the President was reluctant to perform himself, fought political battles on the President’s behalf, and 
sought to draw blame and criticism away from the President in an attempt to protect the President’s political 
interests?
Not A Proxy Very Much A Proxy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
COS Reality-Tester:
On a scale of 1 to 7, to what extent did the COS act as a reality-tester for the President by actively attempting to 
warn the President of potential policy/political hazards and giving him the ‘bad news’?
Not A Reality-Tester Very Much A Reality-Tester
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article.  The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Public 
Administration, published by Wiley-Blackwell.  Copyright restrictions may apply.  doi: 10.1111/padm.12097
19 
Table A1 Pair-Wise Correlations between COS Influence and the 
Main Explanatory Variables
COS Influence
COS Experience .5129
POTUS Experience .0522
White House Organization .5108
COS Working Relationship w/POTUS .6059
COS Working Relationship w/Congress .5393
COS Administrator Role .5241
COS Management Style .3785
POTUS Management Style -.0978
COS Accessibility .1815
POTUS Accessibility -.0034
COS Visibility .5460
COS Guardianship .5564
COS Reality-Tester .6525
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Table A2 Pair-Wise Correlations between all Main Variables*
COS 
Influence
COS 
Experience
POTUS 
Experience
White House 
Organization
COS Working 
Rel. 
w/POTUS
COS Working 
Rel. 
w/Congress
COS 
Admin. 
Role
COS Influence 1.0000
COS Experience .5129 1.0000
POTUS Experience .0522 .0006 1.0000
White House Organization .5108 .2898 .0147 1.0000
COS Working Rel. w/POTUS .6059 .2663 .1177 .2244 1.0000
COS Working Rel. w/Congress .5393 .6136 -.0194 .1907 .4023 1.0000
COS Administrator Role .5241 .2856 -.0173 .4347 .3854 .2969 1.0000
COS Management Style .3785 .2502 .0216 .4447 .2191 .1280 .4769
POTUS Management Style -.0978 -.0649 .1047 -.2824 .0017 -.0088 -.1388
COS Accessibility .1815 .1283 .0462 .1426 .1863 .1970 .2199
POTUS Accessibility -.0034 -.0300 .0762 .0055 .0533 .0516 .0319
COS Visibility .5460 .4361 .0245 .3034 .2763 .3920 .2927
COS Guardianship .5564 .4234 .0251 .3308 .3963 .3384 .4649
COS Reality-Tester .6525 .5476 .0265 .2955 .5275 .6191 .4414
*Continued below on the next page.
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Table A2 Pair-Wise Correlations between all Main Variables (Continued)
COS 
Management 
Style
POTUS 
Management 
Style
COS 
Accessibility
POTUS 
Accessibility
COS 
Visibility
COS
Guardianship
COS    
Reality-
Tester
COS Management Style 1.0000
POTUS Management Style .0523 1.0000
COS Accessibility .1412 .0667 1.0000
POTUS Accessibility .0361 .1122 .5777 1.0000
COS Visibility .2020 .0194 .1779 .0845 1.0000
COS Guardianship .2786 -.0882 .1746 -.0059 .4449 1.0000
COS Reality-Tester .2410 .0148 .1726 .0257 .5274 .5664 1.0000
Table A3 COS Influence (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale White House 
Assistant
White House 
Deputy 
Assistant
White House 
Special 
Assistant
White 
House 
Mixed
Inner 
Cabinet
Inner 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Outer 
Cabinet
Outer 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Total
CODE 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 24
1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 4
2 2 5 6 0 0 0 1 3 17
3 5 8 6 0 0 0 1 1 21
4 4 8 6 0 1 0 2 2 23
5 14 14 18 0 1 0 0 7 54
6 22 35 37 3 0 5 5 13 120
7 23 19 34 2 1 1 2 5 87
Observations 72 90 107 5 3 6 12 31 326
Mean 5.497
Std. Dev. 1.480
Variance 2.189
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Table A4 COS Experience (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale White House 
Assistant
White House 
Deputy 
Assistant
White House 
Special 
Assistant
White 
House 
Mixed
Inner 
Cabinet
Inner 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Outer 
Cabinet
Outer 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Total
CODE 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 24
1 3 4 2 0 0 0 0 1 10
2 6 9 11 0 0 0 2 2 30
3 5 5 7 1 0 0 1 3 22
4 4 12 8 1 0 0 1 2 28
5 11 7 11 0 0 3 1 4 37
6 13 13 12 0 2 0 1 8 49
7 31 42 57 3 1 3 6 11 154
Observations 73 92 108 5 3 6 12 31 330
Mean 5.470
Std. Dev. 1.860
Variance 3.460
Table A5 POTUS Experience (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale White House 
Assistant
White House 
Deputy 
Assistant
White House 
Special 
Assistant
White 
House 
Mixed
Inner 
Cabinet
Inner 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Outer 
Cabinet
Outer 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Total
CODE 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 24
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
4 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
5 3 3 5 1 0 1 1 2 16
6 16 13 13 0 1 3 0 9 55
7 55 73 90 4 2 3 10 20 257
Observations 75 92 109 5 3 7 12 31 334
Mean 6.680
Std. Dev. .677
Variance .459
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Table A6 White House Organization (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale White House 
Assistant
White House 
Deputy 
Assistant
White House 
Special 
Assistant
White 
House 
Mixed
Inner 
Cabinet
Inner 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Outer 
Cabinet
Outer 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Total
CODE 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 24
1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 5
2 5 4 9 0 0 2 0 1 21
3 3 8 6 0 0 0 2 1 20
4 9 15 10 0 0 0 2 10 46
5 17 20 26 0 1 1 2 3 70
6 28 23 26 2 2 2 6 9 98
7 12 19 30 3 0 1 0 6 71
Observations 75 91 108 5 3 6 12 31 331
Mean 5.215
Std. Dev. 1.519
Variance 2.308
Table A7 COS Working Relationship w/POTUS (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale White House 
Assistant
White House 
Deputy 
Assistant
White House 
Special 
Assistant
White 
House 
Mixed
Inner 
Cabinet
Inner 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Outer 
Cabinet
Outer 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Total
CODE 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 24
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 4
3 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 4
4 2 7 6 0 0 0 1 1 17
5 14 17 18 1 1 0 3 7 61
6 28 33 36 1 1 2 2 9 112
7 27 33 44 3 1 2 5 12 127
Observations 74 91 107 5 3 4 12 30 325
Mean 6.012
Std. Dev. 1.048
Variance 1.099
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Table A8 COS Working Relationship w/Congress (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale White House 
Assistant
White House 
Deputy 
Assistant
White House
Special 
Assistant
White 
House 
Mixed
Inner 
Cabinet
Inner 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Outer 
Cabinet
Outer 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Total
CODE 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 24
1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 5
2 6 5 10 0 0 0 1 1 23
3 4 12 13 0 1 0 1 4 35
4 11 11 10 1 0 1 4 7 45
5 10 18 15 1 1 1 2 4 52
6 18 18 30 0 1 0 1 10 78
7 22 27 27 2 0 2 3 3 86
Observations 73 92 106 4 3 4 12 30 324
Mean 5.142
Std. Dev. 1.658
Variance 2.748
Table A9 COS Administrator Role (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale White House 
Assistant
White House 
Deputy Assistant
White House 
Special Assistant
White House 
Mixed
Inner 
Cabinet
Inner Cabinet 
Deputy
Outer 
Cabinet
Outer Cabinet 
Deputy
Total
CODE 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 24
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 9
3 1 6 2 0 0 0 0 3 12
4 6 4 9 0 0 0 2 0 21
5 17 21 25 1 0 0 1 9 74
6 23 32 32 1 2 4 4 10 108
7 25 24 31 3 1 1 3 7 95
Observations 74 90 102 5 3 5 10 30 319
Mean 5.708
Std. Dev. 1.226
Variance 1.503
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Table A10 COS Management Style (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale White House 
Assistant
White House 
Deputy 
Assistant
White House 
Special 
Assistant
White 
House 
Mixed
Inner 
Cabinet
Inner 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Outer 
Cabinet
Outer 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Total
CODE 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 24
1 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 6
2 4 5 4 1 0 0 1 1 16
3 7 13 10 0 0 0 1 2 33
4 6 7 14 0 0 0 2 7 36
5 21 20 22 0 1 2 1 8 75
6 17 27 36 1 0 3 5 8 97
7 15 14 20 3 1 1 1 5 60
Observations 72 89 107 5 2 6 11 31 323
Mean 3.095
Std. Dev. 1.570
Variance 2.466
Table A11 POTUS Management Style (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale White House 
Assistant
White House 
Deputy 
Assistant
White House 
Special 
Assistant
White 
House 
Mixed
Inner 
Cabinet
Inner 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Outer 
Cabinet
Outer 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Total
CODE 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 24
1 11 17 15 1 0 1 1 1 47
2 21 25 33 0 1 2 2 11 95
3 17 15 25 1 1 1 3 8 71
4 11 9 15 2 0 1 4 4 46
5 8 15 10 0 0 2 1 2 38
6 5 8 6 1 0 0 0 2 22
7 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 3 8
Observations 74 90 107 5 2 7 11 31 327
Mean 3.095
Std. Dev. 1.570
Variance 2.466
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Table A12 COS Accessibility (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale White House 
Assistant
White House 
Deputy 
Assistant
White House 
Special 
Assistant
White 
House 
Mixed
Inner 
Cabinet
Inner 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Outer 
Cabinet
Outer 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Total
CODE 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 24
1 1 2 4 0 0 1 1 4 13
2 0 3 13 0 0 0 0 1 17
3 0 5 11 0 1 0 0 1 18
4 2 10 23 0 0 2 0 11 48
5 7 16 13 1 0 2 2 4 45
6 20 25 23 2 0 0 5 6 81
7 46 30 21 2 2 2 4 4 111
Observations 76 91 108 5 3 7 12 31 333
Mean 4.318
Std. Dev. 1.916
Variance 3.672
Table A13 POTUS Accessibility (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale White House 
Assistant
White House 
Deputy 
Assistant
White House 
Special 
Assistant
White 
House 
Mixed
Inner 
Cabinet
Inner 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Outer 
Cabinet
Outer 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Total
CODE 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 24
1 0 3 13 0 0 1 1 2 20
2 2 13 35 1 0 2 0 14 67
3 7 8 11 0 0 2 0 4 32
4 5 18 10 0 0 0 1 5 39
5 20 22 19 1 2 2 5 2 73
6 18 12 9 2 0 0 3 0 44
7 23 16 11 1 1 0 2 4 58
Observations 75 92 108 5 3 7 12 31 333
Mean 4.327
Std. Dev. 1.913
Variance 3.661
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Table A14 COS Visibility (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale White House 
Assistant
White House 
Deputy 
Assistant
White House 
Special 
Assistant
White 
House 
Mixed
Inner 
Cabinet
Inner 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Outer 
Cabinet
Outer 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Total
CODE 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 24
1 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
2 3 6 11 1 0 1 2 2 26
3 13 12 15 0 1 1 2 4 48
4 12 21 17 0 1 1 1 7 60
5 8 18 20 0 1 0 1 10 58
6 19 20 24 2 0 3 3 7 78
7 14 12 19 2 0 0 3 1 51
Observations 72 91 106 5 3 6 12 31 326
Mean 4.773
Std. Dev. 1.599
Variance 2.558
Table A15 COS Guardianship (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale White House 
Assistant
White House 
Deputy 
Assistant
White House 
Special 
Assistant
White 
House 
Mixed
Inner 
Cabinet
Inner 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Outer 
Cabinet
Outer 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Total
CODE 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 24
1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3
2 3 6 7 0 0 0 3 1 20
3 3 4 6 0 0 0 1 2 16
4 10 18 10 1 0 1 1 4 45
5 22 24 25 1 0 2 1 5 80
6 22 22 31 2 3 2 4 14 100
7 11 16 23 1 0 1 2 4 58
Observations 72 90 104 5 3 6 12 30 322
Mean 5.208
Std. Dev. 1.429
Variance 2.041
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Table A16 COS Reality-Tester (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale White House 
Assistant
White House 
Deputy 
Assistant
White House 
Special 
Assistant
White 
House 
Mixed
Inner 
Cabinet
Inner 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Outer 
Cabinet
Outer 
Cabinet 
Deputy
Total
CODE 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 24
1 3 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 7
2 3 6 8 0 0 0 2 2 21
3 2 8 7 0 0 0 0 2 19
4 11 19 8 0 0 0 2 5 41
5 17 18 19 0 2 0 0 6 62
6 17 27 29 3 1 3 5 9 94
7 18 11 28 2 0 1 1 5 66
Observations 71 87 100 5 3 4 11 29 310
Mean 5.181
Std. Dev. 1.574
Variance 2.479
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Table A17 Presidential and Chief of Staff Experience: Comparing Objective and Subjective 
Measures (1981-2001)
President Subjective (Means)* Objective (Years)**
Ronald Reagan 6.439 15
George H.W. Bush 6.76 23
Bill Clinton 6.839 20
Chief of Staff
James A. Baker III 6.474 7
Donald T. Regan 3.094 4
Howard H. Baker, Jr. 7 21
Kenneth M. Duberstein 5.818 13
John H. Sununu 6.125 11
Samuel K. Skinner 4.529 16
Thomas F. McLarty III 2.581 9
Leon E. Panetta 6.78 25
Erskine B. Bowles 4.059 4
John D. Podesta 6.628 11
*Subjective measures are based on the means from our 7-point Likert scale survey scores (see the full 
descriptive statistics in Tables A19-A33).
**Objective measures are based on years of observed experience (see Table A18).
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Table A18 Objective Presidential and Chief of Staff Political Experience (Years)*
President
Ronald Reagan Political launch with Goldwater campaign (1964); Governor of 
California campaign (1966); Governor of California (1967-75); 
Presidential candidate (1976); Political Activism with the Ronald Reagan 
Radio Commentary series and Citizens for the Republic political action 
committee (1976-79); Presidential candidate (1979-80)
George H.W. Bush Chairman of the Republican Party for Harris County, Texas (1964); U.S. 
Senate candidate (1964); U.S. House of Representatives candidate 
(1966); Member, U.S. House of Representatives (TX) (1967-71); U.S. 
Senate candidate (1970); U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. (1971-73); 
Chairman of the Republican National Committee (1973-74); Chief of the 
Liaison Office to the People’s Republic of China (1974-75); Director of 
Central Intelligence (1976-77); Presidential candidate (1980); Vice 
President of the U.S. (1981-89)
Bill Clinton Assistant to Senator Fulbright (1967); Coordinator for McGovern-
Shriver ’72 (1971); U.S. House of Representatives candidate (1974); 
Attorney General of Arkansas candidate (1976); Attorney General of 
Arkansas (1977-79); Governor of Arkansas candidate (1978); Governor 
of Arkansas (1979-81); Governor of Arkansas candidate (1980); 
Governor of Arkansas candidate (1982); Governor of Arkansas (1983-
1992); Presidential candidate (1991)
Chief of Staff
James A. Baker III U.S. Congressional candidate (1969); Chairman, George H.W. Bush 
Senate campaign (1970); Finance Chairman of the Republican Party 
(1971); Gulf Coast Regional Chairman, Nixon Presidential Campaign 
(1972); Undersecretary of Commerce, President Ford (1975); Chairman, 
Gerald Ford election campaign (1976); Attorney General of Texas 
candidate (1978)
Donald T. Regan U.S. Treasury Secretary (1981-85)
Howard H. Baker, Jr. U.S. Senate camp (1964); U.S. Senate candidate (1965); U.S. Senator 
(1966-84); Presidential candidate (1980)
Kenneth M. Duberstein Legislative Assistant to Senator Jacob K. Javits (1966); Director, 
Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs, U.S. General Services 
Administration (1970-76); Deputy Under Secretary, Department of Labor 
(1976-77); Assistant to the President, Legislative Affairs (1981-83); 
Member, Congressional Liaison Team for Reagan-Bush ’84 (1984)
John H. Sununu New Hampshire House of Representatives campaign (1972); New 
Hampshire House of Representatives (1973-75); Governor of New 
Hampshire campaign (1982); Governor of New Hampshire (1983-87); 
Chairman, National Governor’s Association (1978-88)
Samuel K. Skinner U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Illinois (1968-75); U.S. Attorney 
(1975-77); Vice Chairman, President Reagan’s Commission on 
Organized Crime (1984-88); U.S. Secretary of Transportation (1989-91)
Thomas F. McLarty III Arkansas House of Representatives candidate (1970); Arkansas House of 
Representatives (1971-73); Treasurer, gubernatorial election for David 
Pryor (1974); Chairman, Arkansas State Democratic Party (1974-76); 
Member, Democratic National Committee (1976-77); Treasurer, 
gubernatorial election for Bill Clinton (1980)
Leon E. Panetta Legislative Assistant to Senator Thomas Kuchel (1966-69); Assistant to 
the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(1969-70); Assistant to John Lindsay, New York Mayor (1970-71); U.S. 
House of Representatives candidate (1976); Member, U.S. House of 
Representatives (CA) (1977-93); Director, Office of Management and 
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Budget (OMB) (1993-94)
Erskine B. Bowles Gubernatorial campaign for Hargrove Bowles (father) (1972); Fundraiser 
for Clinton-Gore ’92 (1992); Head of the Small Business Administration 
(SBA) (1993); White House Deputy Chief of Staff (1994-95)
John D. Podesta Counsel on the Majority Staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee and 
Chief Minority Counsel for two Senate Judiciary Subcommittees (1979-
81); Chief Counsel for the Senate Agricultural Committee (1987-88); 
Assistant to the President, Staff Secretary, and Senior Policy Advisor 
(1993-95); Counselor to Senator Thomas Daschle (1995-96); White 
House Deputy Chief of Staff (1997-98)
*Rounded to the nearest year.  Years where overlap occurs due to holding more than one position (or 
activity) at a time are counted as a single year of experience.
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article.  The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Public 
Administration, published by Wiley-Blackwell.  Copyright restrictions may apply.  doi: 10.1111/padm.12097
32 
Table A19 POTUS Experience (Overall Descriptive 
Statistics)
Likert Scale Frequency Percent
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 2 .6
4 4 1.2
5 16 4.79
6 55 16.47
7 257 76.95
Total 334 100
Mean 6.68
Std. Dev. .677
Table A20 COS Experience (Overall Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale Frequency Percent
1 10 3.03
2 30 9.09
3 22 6.67
4 28 8.48
5 37 11.21
6 49 14.85
7 154 46.67
Total 330 100
Mean 5.47
Std. Dev. 1.86
Table A21 Reagan Experience (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale Frequency Percent
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 1 .81
4 1 .81
5 16 13.01
6 30 24.39
7 75 60.98
Total 123 100
Mean 6.439
Std. Dev. .811
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Table A22 G.W. Bush Experience (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale Frequency Percent
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 1 2
4 0 0
5 0 0
6 8 16
7 41 82
Total 50 100
Mean 6.76
Std. Dev. .657
Table A23 Clinton Experience (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale Frequency Percent
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 3 1.86
5 0 0
6 17 10.56
7 141 87.58
Total 161 100
Mean 6.839
Std. Dev. .499
Table A24 J. Baker Experience (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale Frequency Percent
1 0 0
2 1 2.63
3 0 0
4 1 2.63
5 3 7.89
6 6 15.79
7 27 71.05
Total 38 100
Mean 6.474
Std. Dev. 1.059
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Table A25 Regan Experience (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale Frequency Percent
1 2 6.25
2 10 31.25
3 9 28.13
4 6 18.75
5 4 12.5
6 1 3.13
7 0 0
Total 32 100
Mean 3.094
Std. Dev. 1.254
Table A26 H. Baker Experience (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale Frequency Percent
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
5 0 0
6 0 0
7 31 100
Total 31 100
Mean 7
Std. Dev. 0
Table A27 Duberstein Experience (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale Frequency Percent
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 2 9.09
5 7 31.82
6 6 27.27
7 7 31.82
Total 22 100
Mean 5.818
Std. Dev. 1.006
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Table A28 Sununu Experience (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale Frequency Percent
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 1 3.13
4 2 6.25
5 5 15.63
6 8 25
7 16 50
Total 32 100
Mean 6.125
Std. Dev. 1.1
Table A29 Skinner Experience (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale Frequency Percent
1 0 0
2 2 11.76
3 0 0
4 6 35.29
5 5 29.41
6 4 23.53
7 0 0
Total 17 100
Mean 4.529
Std. Dev. 1.231
Table A30 McLarty Experience (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale Frequency Percent
1 8 25.81
2 12 38.71
3 3 9.68
4 3 9.68
5 3 9.68
6 2 6.45
7 0 0
Total 31 100
Mean 2.581
Std. Dev. 1.544
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Table A31 Panetta Experience (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale Frequency Percent
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 1 2
5 0 0
6 8 16
7 41 82
Total 50 100
Mean 6.78
Std. Dev. .545
Table A32 Bowles Experience (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale Frequency Percent
1 0 0
2 5 14.71
3 9 26.47
4 6 17.65
5 9 26.47
6 3 8.82
7 2 5.88
Total 34 100
Mean 4.059
Std. Dev. 1.434
Table A33 Podesta Experience (Descriptive Statistics)
Likert Scale Frequency Percent
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 1 2.33
5 1 2.33
6 11 25.58
7 30 69.77
Total 43 100
Mean 6.628
Std. Dev. .655
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